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Sentences involving past tense verbs, such as “My dogs were on the carpet”, tend to give rise 
to the inference that the corresponding present tense version, “My dogs are on the  carpet”, is 
false. This inference is often referred to as a cessation or temporal inference, and is  generally 
analyzed as a type of implicature. There are two main proposals for capturing this  asymmetry: 
one assumes a difference in informativity between the past and present counterparts ( Altshuler 
&  Schwarzschild 2013), while the other proposes a structural difference between the two 
(Thomas 2012). The two approaches are similar in terms of empirical coverage, but differ in 
their  predictions for  language acquisition. Using a novel animated picture selection paradigm, 
we investigated these  predictions. Specifically, we compared the performance of a group of 
4–6-year-old  children and a group of adults on temporal inferences, scalar implicatures  arising 
from “some”, and  inferences of adverbial modifiers under negation. The results revealed that 
overall,  children  computed all three inferences at a lower rate than adult controls; however 
they were more  adult-like on  temporal inferences and inferences of adverbial modifiers than 
on  scalar  implicatures. We  discuss the implications of the findings, both for a developmental 
alternatives-based hypothesis (e.g., Barner et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2016; 2018), as 
well as theories of temporal inferences, arguing that the finding that children were more (and 
equally) adult-like on temporal inferences and adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory 
of temporal inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012).
Keywords: temporal inferences; scalar implicatures; alternatives-based hypothesis; language 
acquisition; semantics; pragmatics
1 Introduction
Sentences involving past tense verbs like (1a) tend to give rise to the inference that the 
corresponding present tense sentence (2a) is false. By contrast, present tense sentences 
like (2a) do not suggest that the corresponding past tense version (1a) is false.1
 1 A similar situation arises in the case of future sentences like (i) and their present tense counterparts, i.e. (ii). 
In order to set aside the potential complications involving the contribution of will (see Santorio & Romoli 
2018 and references therein), we will focus on past tense sentences like (1).
(i) a. My dogs will be in the basket.
b. ⇝ My dogs aren’t in the basket (yet)
(ii) a. My dogs are in the basket.
b. ⇝ ̸ My dogs will not be in the basket
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(1) a. My dogs were in the basket.
b. ⇝ My dogs aren’t in the basket
(2) a. My dogs are in the basket.
b. ⇝̸ My dogs weren’t in the basket
The inference in (1b) is generally referred to as a cessation or temporal inference. It is typi-
cally analyzed as a type of scalar implicature, arising through a comparison between (1a) 
and its alternative in (2a) (Musan 1995; Magri 2009; 2011; Thomas 2012; Altshuler & 
Schwarzschild 2013; Sudo & Romoli 2017).
There are two main proposals in the literature for capturing the asymmetry between the 
sentences in (1a) and (2a). The first is based on the assumption that the two sentences dif-
fer in their informativity; we will refer to this approach as the semantic approach. This 
approach argues that a present tense sentence like (2a) entails its past counterpart in (1a). 
This, in turn, predicts that when (2a) is uttered, its alternative, (1a) cannot be negated 
as it is entailed by the assertion itself (Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013). An alternative 
analysis of the asymmetry above, which we will refer to as the structural approach, 
assumes a structural difference between a present tense sentence and its past counter-
part. On this latter approach, a sentence like (1) is logically independent from a sentence 
like (2), but the former is more complex – and in fact structurally contains – the latter 
(Thomas 2012). This assumption, in combination with a structural theory of alternatives 
(Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011; Trinh & Haida 2015), results in (2) being an alternative 
of (1) but not vice versa. This in turn correctly predicts that (2) cannot have the negation 
of (1) as an inference.
The two approaches share assumptions regarding the semantics of the present and past 
tense sentences, as well as the idea that temporal inferences are a type of implicature; 
they thus have similar empirical coverage, for example capturing the asymmetry between 
(1a) and (2a). One crucial point of divergence between the two analyses, however, is that 
they make different developmental predictions. In particular, as we argue below, only the 
structural approach, in combination with a recent alternatives-based hypothesis concern-
ing the acquisition of implicatures, predicts that children should be more adult-like on 
temporal inferences compared to more traditional implicatures.
The present study tests this prediction by comparing the performance of 4–6-year-
old children and adults on sentences like (1). We developed a novel group selection task 
based on Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3) and tested children and adults on temporal 
inferences, scalar implicatures, and inferences arising from adverbial modification in 
negative sentences. The main finding was that children were more adult-like in their 
derivation of temporal inferences and inferences arising from adverbial modification 
in negative sentences than in their derivation of the not all implicature of “some”. We 
argue that the observed pattern of performance is predicted by Thomas’s (2012) theory 
of temporal inferences, combined with a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis 
for scalar inferences (such as the Restricted Alternatives Hypothesis proposed in Tieu 
et al. 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the two 
approaches to temporal inferences in more detail. In Section 3, we introduce the lexical 
alternatives-based hypothesis concerning the acquisition of implicatures. In Section 4 we 
discuss the case of negated adverbial modifiers and in Section 5, we outline the experi-
mental predictions for temporal inferences and inferences arising from negated adverbial 
modifiers. In Section 6, we present our experiment and in Section 7 we discuss the results 
in the context of the theories and their predictions.
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2 Two theories of temporal inferences
As outlined in Section 1, there are two main proposals for explaining the asymmetry 
between past tense sentences like (1a) and present tense sentences like (2a). The  semantic 
approach is based on informativity, while the structural approach is based on struc-
tural differences between the two sentences. We outline some common assumptions of the 
two approaches below before discussing each in greater detail.
2.1 Common assumptions
Under both approaches, a semantics for past and present sentences along the lines of (3) 
and (4) is assumed (where time(c) represents the time of utterance in the given context):2
(3) ⟦My dogs were in the basket⟧c =
∃t[t < time(c) ∧ in-the-basket(my-dogs)(t)]
(4) ⟦My dogs are in the basket⟧c =
∃t[time(c) ∈ t ∧ in-the-basket(my-dogs)(t)]
In the absence of additional assumptions, the meanings in (3) and (4) make the two 
sentences logically independent: the first simply tells us that there is a time prior to the 
utterance time in which my dogs were in the basket. This leaves open whether they are in 
the basket at a time that includes the utterance time, which corresponds to the conditions 
under which (4) is true. Conversely, (4) merely says that there is a time that includes the 
utterance time in which my dogs are in the basket. It leaves open whether there was a 
time beforehand in which they were in the basket.
In addition, under both approaches, the temporal inference arising from (3) should be 
analyzed as a type of implicature. The main argument for this approach to temporal infer-
ences comes from the fact that, like standard scalar implicatures, temporal inferences are 
easily cancellable. The scalar implicature of “some” in (5), for example, is easily cancelled:
(5) John met some of his students yesterday; in fact he met all of them.
The temporal inference arising from (6) can likewise be cancelled when followed by “… 
and they still are”, without incurring a contradiction.
(6) My dogs were in the basket.
(7) My dogs are in the basket.
Let us briefly sketch how the implicature from (6) to the negation of (7) is derived. We 
will illustrate this using a simplified Gricean algorithm for scalar implicatures, acknowl-
edging however that any theory of scalar implicatures that includes the characteristics 
below will be compatible with the implicature approaches we have mentioned.3 The basic 
idea is that rational interactions between conversational participants are guided by gen-
eral principles of co-operation (see Grice 1975 and much subsequent work). In particular, 
the assumption is that upon hearing an utterance, the hearer will reason about what the 
 2 This is the semantics assumed in Sudo & Romoli (2017). The semantics assumed by Thomas (2012) and 
 Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) differ slightly but not in a crucial way for our purposes. The most impor-
tant difference is with respect to the assumption about stative predicates which changes the entailment 
relation between (3) and (4). We return to this in the next subsection.
 3 Notice in particular that at least for Thomas (2012), the theory has to be one in which implicatures are 
derived not only on the basis of stronger alternatives but also on the basis of logically independent ones.
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speaker might have said instead, with various assumptions about what led the speaker to 
say what she said rather than something else. Among these assumptions, the one that is 
relevant here is the assumption that the speaker is being as informative as is required. The 
fact that the speaker chose to assert what they did and not something else (among a set 
of restricted relevant competitors) leads the hearer to conclude that the competitors that 
are not already entailed by the assertion must be false.4 Therefore in the case of temporal 
inferences, assuming that (6) and (7) are competitors, upon hearing the sentence in (6) 
the hearer will conclude that the speaker must think that (7) is false, thereby deriving the 
desired temporal inference that my dogs are not in the basket. This follows the simplified 
Gricean algorithm in (8):
(8) The speaker said A.
The speaker could have said B instead (but didn’t).
It is false that B.
A problem arises, however, given the assumed literal meanings provided in (3) and (4) 
and the reasoning provided above, namely, we should expect to derive an implicature 
from (7) that is the negation of (6). That is, we would incorrectly predict from (7) the 
inference that my dogs were not in the basket (before). Yet, as we have observed, only (6) 
gives rise to a temporal inference involving the negation of (7). This is where the two 
theoretical approaches diverge.
Under the semantic approach, the asymmetry between (6) and (7) is derived by assum-
ing differences in the semantic relationships between the two sentence types. On the other 
hand, the structural approach derives the asymmetry by making additional assump-
tions regarding the syntactic structures of the two sentences, in combination with a theory 
of scalar competitors that is sensitive to the syntactic structure. In the next subsections, 
we outline the two approaches and their differences in greater detail. We then turn to the 
different developmental predictions they make, which constitute the motivation for the 
experiment we present in Section 6.
2.2 The semantic approach
As discussed above, without additional assumptions, the literal meanings of (6) and (7) 
are logically independent. Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) argue, however, that (7) 
actually entails (6), once the following assumption is made:
(9) Temporal profiles of statives: If a tenseless stative clause ∅ is true at moment 
m, then there is a moment m′ preceding m at which that ∅ is true.
And indeed, it is easy to see that if we assume (9), then it follows that (7) is stronger than 
(6): this is because if there is a time which includes the utterance time at which my dogs 
are in the basket, then on the basis of (9), there must be a moment prior to that time 
(and henceforth prior to the utterance time), in which my dogs were in the basket. This 
automatically makes (6) true. The opposite does not hold, of course: there can be a time 
prior to the utterance time in which my dogs were in the basket, without there being a 
time including the utterance time in which they still are in the basket. In sum, given the 
assumption in (9), Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) argue that (7) asymmetrically entails 
(6). This, in turn, in combination with a theory of implicature as sketched above, correctly 
 4 More precisely, the hearer will conclude that it is not true that the speaker believes that the stronger com-
petitors are true, which, given other assumptions, can be strengthened to the speaker’s belief that the com-
petitors are false, and even further to the competitors actually being false. See Gamut (1991) for discussion.
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predicts that the former cannot have the negation of the latter as an implicature, because 
the latter is entailed by the former.
In other words, for Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013), the asymmetry between past and 
present sentences is based on the entailment relation between them. In the next subsec-
tion we turn to an alternative approach proposed by Thomas (2012), which involves a 
very different way of obtaining the asymmetry between present and past sentences.
2.3 The structural approach
There exists an alternative to the semantic approach discussed above that does not involve 
the assumption in (9). According to Thomas (2012), a present tense sentence and its past 
counterpart remain logically independent and cannot be distinguished by informativity 
as per the semantic approach. This, in combination with a theory of implicatures that 
allows implicatures to arise from alternatives that are logically independent from the 
assertion, would correctly predict the target temporal inference from the past sentence 
to the negation of the present counterpart, but it would also incorrectly derive a corre-
sponding  temporal inference from the present tense sentence to the negation of the past 
counterpart. To address this issue, Thomas (2012), building on an observation in Dowty 
(1979), argues that the two sentences are structurally distinct. In particular, a present 
tense  sentence would have the LF in (10a) (where the T head only contains a pointer to 
the time of utterance N), while the past tense counterpart would have the LF in (10b), 
involving additional covert temporal operators.
(10) a. [[T n ] [ my dogs are in the basket ]]b. [[T once [ past n ] [ my dogs are in the basket ]]]
Importantly, (10b) is more complex and in fact contains (10a). This, in combination with 
a structural theory of alternatives (Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011; Trinh & Haida 2015) 
immediately predicts that (10a) can be an alternative of (10b), but not vice versa. This 
is because under such approaches to alternatives, a sentence can have its subparts as 
alternatives, but not vice versa. In other words, this structural asymmetry ensures that 
the present tense sentence is an alternative of the past tense one, but the latter is not an 
alternative of the former. This, in turn, correctly predicts that (10b) (i.e. (6)) can have 
the negation of (10a) (i.e. (7)) as an inference (given our description of the derivation 
of inferences above), while (10a)/(7) cannot give rise to the negation of (10b)/(6) as an 
inference.
In sum, the two approaches outlined above derive the asymmetry between a present 
tense sentence and its past counterpart with respect to temporal inferences in quite dif-
ferent ways. We turn next to the developmental predictions of these approaches, which 
diverge given recent hypotheses regarding children’s performance on scalar implicatures.
3 A developmental alternatives-based hypothesis
A fairly robust finding in the developmental literature on scalar implicatures is that 
4–6-year-old children tend to differ from adults in how they respond to underinforma-
tive scalar sentences. For example, several earlier studies observed that children tend 
to respond to underinformative sentences containing scalar terms like disjunction and 
the existential quantifier “some” on the basis of a literal interpretation, rather than one 
that includes the relevant scalar implicature (see Noveck 2001; Chierchia et al. 2001; 
 Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Guasti et al. 2005, among many others). In one of the ear-
liest studies, Noveck (2001) presented participants with sentences such as (11), which 
gives rise to the scalar implicature that not all giraffes have long necks. This implicature is 
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falsified by common knowledge, and so participants were expected to reject the sentence 
if they computed the implicature.
(11) Some giraffes have long necks.
Noveck observed that child participants rejected statements like (11) less often than 
adults did, and took this as evidence that preschool-aged children derive fewer scalar 
inferences than adults. This behavioral difference between children and adults has since 
been replicated.
More recent studies have revealed that there are certain inferences that children can 
compute at adult-like rates, in contrast to their performance on standard cases like the 
some-not-all implicature. One such example is the so-called free choice inference, investi-
gated by Tieu et al. (2016). Consider the sentence in (12a) and its associated inference in 
(12b):
(12) a. Jack can have cake or ice cream.
b. ⇝ Jack can have cake and Jack can have ice cream
The inference in (12b) is traditionally referred to as a free choice inference, the intui-
tion being that the sentence in (12a) grants Jack free choice between the two options 
of cake and ice cream. Such inferences have received a scalar inference analysis in the 
formal semantics literature (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Alonso Ovalle 2005; Fox 2007; 
 Klinedinst 2007; Chemla 2009; Santorio & Romoli 2018), which we return to below. Tieu 
et al. (2016) investigated children’s interpretation of modal statements containing dis-
junction (in Mandarin) and “any” (in English). Both sentence types give rise to free choice 
inferences. Tieu et al. observed that children computed free choice inferences around 
90% of the time, whereas they computed standard implicatures involving plain disjunc-
tion (“or”/”and”) and modals (“may”/”must”) at typically low rates. In addition to free 
choice inferences, children have been reported to compute a handful of other inferences 
at adult-like rates, including the exactly-n inference of numerals (Papafragou & Musolino 
2003; Barner & Bachrach 2010), ad hoc implicatures (Barner et al. 2011; Stiller et al. 
2015), ignorance inferences (Hochstein et al. 2016), and various inferences of simple and 
embedded disjunctions (Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2017).
The apparent variability in children’s performance on implicatures (i.e. their relatively 
poorer performance on implicatures involving plain disjunction, the quantifier “some”, 
and the weak modal “may”/”might”, compared to their strong performance on free choice, 
ad hoc, and numeral implicatures) has led to much recent discussion in the developmental 
literature. One recent developmental proposal aims to capture children’s variable per-
formance by appealing to the nature of the alternatives required to compute the relevant 
inferences. Specifically, the inferences on which children perform at non-adult-like levels 
tend to involve lexical alternatives (e.g., “some” vs. “all”, “or” vs. “and”, “may” vs. “must”), 
while the inferences that children are able to compute at adult-like levels involve alter-
natives that can be retrieved from the context or the sentence itself (see the Restricted 
Alternatives Hypothesis proposed in Tieu et al. 2016 as well as discussion in Barner et al. 
2011; Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2017, among others).
Under this approach, children differ from adults in computing scalar implicatures because 
they struggle to access the alternatives required for the computation of the relevant impli-
catures. This is supported by the finding that children in fact readily compute inferences 
for which the relevant alternatives are easily accessible or salient in the context (Barner 
et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2016; 2017, among others; see also discussion 
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in Skordos & Papafragou 2016 for the role of the relevance of the required alternatives). 
Take the case of the free choice inference. On the implicature approach to free choice 
inferences, the inference in (13b) is derived through the negation of the substring alterna-
tives in (13c) and (13d) (if it’s false that Jack is restricted to cake and it’s false that Jack is 
restricted to ice cream, it follows that he can have cake and he can have ice cream).
(13) a. Jack can have cake or ice cream.
b. ⇝ Jack can have cake and Jack can have ice cream
c. Jack can only have cake.
d. Jack can only have ice cream.
Given the alternatives are provided as substrings of the assertion, children are not required 
to have lexicalized the scalar alternatives, nor do they have to retrieve scalar alternatives 
from the lexicon. In contrast to the free choice inference, consider a traditional impli-
cature like (14b) from (14a). The not all implicature requires that the child access the 
stronger scalar term “all” upon hearing “some”, a term that is not contained within the 
original assertion.
(14) a. Some of my dogs jumped on the bed.
b. ⇝ Not all of my dogs jumped on the bed
Further evidence for the conjecture that accessing lexical alternatives is demanding can 
be found in adult studies, which have revealed that adults tend to be slower to compute 
precisely those implicatures that are acquired late by children. Here too, a similar hypoth-
esis has been proposed, namely that scalar implicatures that require accessing the lexicon 
are more costly and are therefore slower to be computed compared to inferences that only 
require accessing elements that have already been processed, e.g., elements contained 
within the assertion (Chemla & Bott 2014; Van Tiel & Schaeken 2017).
Summarizing, the alternatives-based hypothesis locates the source of children’s variable 
behavior in the nature of the alternatives involved in implicature computation. For our 
purposes, the most relevant prediction of this approach is that children should perform 
at adult-like levels on scalar implicatures for which the relevant alternatives are structur-
ally contained within the assertion. As we will see in the next subsection, assuming the 
alternatives-based hypothesis, the semantic and structural approaches to temporal infer-
ences described above make divergent predictions for how children should perform on 
temporal inferences.5
4 The case of negated adverbial modifiers: A baseline
Sentences containing negated adverbial modifiers, such as (15a), tend to give rise to the 
inference that the corresponding unmodified positive sentence is true; for instance, (15a) 
suggests quite robustly that my dogs did jump (Simons 2001; Katzir 2007; Schlenker 2008).
 5 Note that we will assume that children in the age range tested in our experiment (4–6 years) have acquired 
the basic forms and meanings of the present and past tense in English (this will also be supported by the use 
of appropriate experimental controls). For documentation and discussion of children’s development of tense 
in production and comprehension, see among others, Brown (1973); Antinucci & Miller (1976);  Kuczaj 
(1977); Weist (1986); Weist et al. (1991); Shirai & Andersen (1995); Marchman et al. (1997);  Wagner 
(1998; 2001); Valian (2006); Shirai & Miyata (2006); Wagner (2010). What is crucial for our purposes is 
that children in the age range we tested have already acquired the basic meaning of tense; Valian (2006), 
for example, reports that children as young as 2 years of age successfully distinguish the present and past 
tense auxiliary “will”/”did” and copula “is”/”was”. The children who participated in our experimental 
study were of mean age 5;04, and thus we can assume they had already acquired the basic meaning of the 
past tense.
Cremers et al: Testing theories of temporal inferencesArt. 139, page 8 of 21  
(15) a. My dogs didn’t jump high.
b. ⇝ My dogs jumped
The inference in (15b) is typically analyzed as a scalar implicature arising from the nega-
tion of the simpler alternative in (16), i.e. the sentence without the adverbial modifier 
(Katzir 2007). As (16) is more informative than (15a), the hearer will reason along the 
lines above and conclude that (16) is false, thereby concluding (15b).
(16) My dogs didn’t jump.
This kind of explanation also extends to analogous inferences arising in other downward-
entailing contexts, as shown by Katzir (2007). What is crucial for our purposes is that the 
inference of the negated adverbial modifier arises from an alternative that is structurally 
contained within the assertion, as shown in (17a) and (17b).
(17) a. [not[my dogs [jumped [high]]]]
b. [not[my dogs [jumped]]]
This inference therefore presents a straightforward test of the alternatives-based hypothe-
sis. Children are expected to compute this inference at an adult-like rate, since the required 
alternative is easily retrievable from the assertion itself. The inference of negated adver-
bial modifiers will therefore provide a reasonable baseline for comparison with temporal 
inferences, on the one hand, and the standard lexical scale-based implicature of “some”, 
on the other hand.
5 Predictions
The two theories of temporal inferences that we have discussed both manage to capture 
the relevant temporal inference that arises from past tense sentences like (6). When we 
turn to child language, however, we see that the two theories make divergent predictions 
for how children should perform on temporal inferences.
Let us consider first the structural approach, which assumes that a present tense 
sentence is structurally contained within its corresponding past tense one. This assump-
tion, in combination with a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis leads to the pre-
diction in (18) that children should be more adult-like in their computation of temporal 
inferences, compared to how they perform on classical scalar implicatures.
(18) Prediction of the structural approach: Children will display more adult-like 
behavior on temporal inferences than on standard scalar implicatures involving 
lexical replacement.
Under the semantic approach, on the other hand, temporal inferences arise as a regular 
implicature. Crucially, this theory does not make any assumptions about the structural 
relationship between the past tense sentence and its present counterpart. There is, there-
fore, no expectation that children should be more or less adult-like on temporal inferences 
compared to other implicatures. If anything, without further assumptions about the syn-
tax of these sentences, this approach instead predicts that children should display similar 
performance on temporal inferences and classical scalar implicatures, or at least that they 
might differ from adults in the same way on the two inferences (see Renans et al. 2018 
and Tieu et al. 2018 for discussion of a similar uniformity prediction in the domain of 
plurality inferences). That is, if children differ from adults, they should differ to the same 
degree for temporal inferences and standard implicatures; there is no specific theoretical 
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reason to expect that they should fare better (i.e. be more adult-like) on one inference 
compared to another:6
(19) Prediction of the semantic approach: The difference that is observed 
between children and adults on standard implicatures, if any, should also be 
observed for temporal inferences.
In sum, comparing temporal inferences to classical scalar implicatures, the structural 
approach predicts an interaction between group and inference type, with children per-
forming more like adults on temporal inferences than on standard implicatures (that 
require lexical replacement). On the other hand, the semantic account predicts no such 
interaction.
To test the predictions above, we designed an experiment to test children and adults 
on temporal inferences, the standard not all implicature of the quantifier “some”, and the 
inferences of negated adverbial modifiers. The case of “some” provides a baseline infer-
ence on which children are expected to differ from adults, as the inference requires the 
lexical replacement of alternatives. The case of the negated adverbial modifier involves 
alternatives that are contained within the assertion, and therefore provides a baseline 
inference for which we expect to observe more adult-like behavior from children, since 
no lexical replacement of alternatives is required.
To summarize, we have two inferences that will serve as a baseline against which tem-
poral inferences will be compared, one involving replacement of lexical alternatives, as in 
(20), and one involving non-replacement alternatives, as in (21).
(20) a. Some of my dogs jumped.
b. All of my dogs jumped. replacement alternative
c. ⇝ Not all of my dogs jumped
(21) a. My dogs didn’t jump high.
b. My dogs didn’t jump. non-replacement alternative
c. ⇝ My dogs jumped
Given this three-way comparison, the structural approach, in combination with the 
developmental alternatives-based hypothesis, gives rise to the prediction in (22).
(22) Prediction of structural approach in combination with alternatives-
based hypothesis: Children’s performance on temporal inferences and negated 
adverbial modifiers should be more adult-like than their performance on the not 
all implicature of “some”.
We turn now to our experiment, which tested the prediction in (22).
 6 As an anonymous reviewer points out, one could supplement the semantic approach with an assumption 
about saliency of alternatives, for instance that temporal alternatives are simply more salient to children 
than the alternative of some. This has been proposed in the case of numerals, where children’s perfor-
mance is typically more adult-like compared to their performance on other scalar terms (Papafragou & 
 Musolino 2003, among others). Unlike the case of numerals, however, where children are explicitly taught 
the numeral scale from an early age, and therefore might plausibly be more familiar with the alternatives, it 
is not clear to us why temporal alternatives should be more salient for children than scalar quantifier alter-
natives. Without independent justification for distinguishing among these alternatives through salience, we 
therefore identify the main prediction of the semantic approach as that in (19).
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6 Experiment
We tested the predictions outlined in Section 5 by comparing the performance of a group 
of 4–6-year-old children with that of a group of adults on temporal inferences, the classi-
cal scalar implicature of “some”, and negative sentences involving adverbial modification.
6.1 Methods
6.1.1 Participants
38 English-speaking children (4;02–5;11, M = 5;04) recruited from preschools in Belfast 
and 38 English-speaking adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (age range 
21–55) participated in the experiment. One child and four adults were excluded from 
analysis because their error rate on control and filler items exceeded 25%, leaving a total 
of 37 children and 34 adults for analysis.
6.1.2 Procedure
We developed a novel task based on the sentence-to-picture-matching task employed in 
Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3), which involved matching a spoken sentence to one of 
three picture alternatives featured in an animated video sequence.7 Participants watched 
a series of animated videos, each involving three groups of characters (differently colored 
dogs, birds, divers, or ducks). The participants’ task was to guess which color characters 
belonged to Raffie based on a clue that the puppet would give at the end of each video 
sequence. At the beginning of each video sequence, the narrator introduced the characters 
on the screen, as in (23).8
(23) Narrator: There are three dogs playing in the room. See! Black dogs, grey dogs, and 
brown dogs. One of the three groups of dogs belongs to Raffie. Your job is to guess 
which color dogs are his. Listen for the clue.
After the narrator introduced the characters and reminded the participant to listen for the 
clue, the video began and the characters became animated on the screen. At this point, all 
three sets of dogs were in the basket. Then, each of the sets of dogs completed an action. 
One set jumped low onto the bottom bunk of the bed, and then another set jumped high 
onto the top bunk of the bed. The third set remained in the basket. At this point, a bell 
would sound and an animated question mark would appear on the screen, indicating 
that the characters had completed their actions and that the puppet was about to provide 
a clue. The puppet then provided a clue relating to the action. A sample clue from the 
adverbial modifier condition is provided in (24).
(24) Puppet: My dogs didn’t jump high.
Participants were then asked to provide a response to the question, “Which dogs belong to 
Raffie?” Child participants provided their responses by placing stickers on multiple choice 
answer sheets that corresponded to the characters on the screen (see Figure 1). Adult par-
ticipants provided their responses by clicking on one of three response buttons indicating 
 7 A pilot study using a truth value judgment task showed that adults were unwilling to reject sentences like 
(1) when its literal meaning was true but its temporal inference was false. We thus moved to a selection 
task, which intuitively made the reading with the implicature more attractive, but at the time were not 
aware of the results reported in Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3). As we will discuss further in the Discussion, 
our experiment did not replicate Katsos & Bishop’s findings for the quantifier “some”: even with the selec-
tion task, the children we tested were not adult-like at deriving the not all implicature.
 8 Testing with child participants was done face to face with the narrations carried out by the individual con-
ducting the experiment. For adult participants, we developed an online version of the experiment, which 
can be found at http://spellout.net/ibexexps/AnonymizedExps/SuB.
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the colour associated with the group of dogs they wanted to choose as their answer (e.g., 
“Black”, “Grey”, “Brown”).
6.1.3 Materials
The three groups of characters (Literal, Target, False) differed in whether they made the 
literal interpretation and the implicature of the sentence true or false. The Literal group 
satisfied the literal interpretation of the puppet’s clue, but not its implicature; the Target 
group was consistent with both the literal meaning and the implicature of the puppet’s 
sentence. Deriving the appropriate inference was thus necessary in order to distinguish 
between these two groups. The third group, the False group, was a distractor that failed to 
satisfy the literal meaning of the sentence; the inclusion of these distractors allowed us to 
check whether children had correctly understood the task.
The target sentences and their respective implicatures are provided in (25)–(27). 
Figure 2 provides sample screen shots of the target items for the TI, SI, and AM conditions. 
In Table 1, we describe the animations for each character group. Figure 3 provides an 
example of the visual display prior to and after the relevant action for the TI target item.
(25) My dogs were in the basket.
⇝ My dogs aren’t in the basket temporal inference (TI)
(26) Some of my dogs are in the basket.
⇝ Not all of my dogs are in the basket scalar implicature (SI)
(27) My dogs didn’t jump high.
⇝ My dogs jumped adverbial modifier under negation (AM)
Each participant received 23 trials in total: 4 repetitions of each target type, 6 control 
items that contained a Target group and two distinct False groups (2 for each target type), 
Figure 1: Sample answer sheet for collecting responses from children.
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2  present tense controls, and 3 fillers. In Table 2, we describe the animations for each 
character group in the control items. Figure 4 provides an example of the visual display 
prior to and after the relevant action for the TI control trial.
Items were presented in one of two pseudo-randomized orders, which ensured, among 
other things, that the present tense controls never appeared before a TI target item (since 
this would make the alternative contextually salient for the temporal inference). To 
make it clear that the puppet’s use of the past tense could not refer to a time coinciding 
with the end state, the characters remained animated on the screen until a response was 
provided.
6.2 Results
The raw data and analysis script for the experiment are available for download at: https://
semanticsarchive.net/Archive/mQ3MDRiN/Cremers-Kane-Tieu-Kennedy-Sudo-Folli-
Romoli-AcqTemporalInferences.html.
Figure 2: Screen captures of target items in each condition.
Table 1: Location of Target, Literal, and False groups during animation, for each condition.
Target Group Literal Group False Group
Literal meaning: True True False
Inference: True False False
TEMPORAL (25)  
“My dogs were in the basket”
in basket, then move in basket throughout never in basket
SCALAR (26)  
“Some of my dogs jumped”
some on the bed, some not all on the bed none on the bed
ADVERBIAL (27)  
“My dogs didn’t jump high”
jumped low didn’t jump jumped high
Figure 3: Visual stimuli for the TI target “My dogs were in the basket”.
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The mean error rate on control and filler items before exclusion of any participants was 
12% for adults and 6% for children, suggesting that the task did not pose any particular 
difficulty. We then excluded four adult participants and one child whose error rate was 
above 25%. Figure 5 presents the proportion of Target, Literal, and False group selections 
for the target items, made by adults and children.
For statistical analysis, we excluded the False responses (under the assumption that 
they reflected difficulty in understanding the stimuli/situation and not the target sen-
tence) and focused on Target and Literal responses on the target trials. The dependent 
variable was therefore a two-level categorical variable. Figure 6 provides a boxplot dis-
playing each participant’s behavior once False responses are excluded. A mixed-effects 
binomial logistic regression model was fitted to the data predicting the probability of 
a Target response as a function of Condition (TI, SI or AM, treatment-coded with TI 
as a baseline), Group (child vs. adult, sum-coded), and their interaction. We included 
random slopes for Condition and further simplified the random effects structure fol-
lowing the recommendations of Bates et al. (2015).9 The detailed results are provided 
in Table 3.
 9 More concretely, after fitting a maximal model in the sense of Barr et al. (2013), we ran a principal compo-
nent analysis on the random effects and refitted the model, keeping only components that explained at least 
5% of the variance explained by the main component. The selection of components for Subject and Item 
random effects was done independently, as the random effects for Item tend to be much smaller. The final 
“parsimonious” model included two Subject random effects and one Item random effect.
Table 2: Location of Target and False groups during animation, for control trials.
Target Group False Group 1 False Group 2
Literal meaning True False False
TEMPORAL (25)  
“My dogs were in the basket”
in basket, then move never in basket never in basket
SCALAR (26)  
“Some of my dogs jumped”
some on the bed, some not all on the bed all on the bed
ADVERBIAL (27)  
“My dogs didn’t jump high”
jumped low jumped high jumped high
PRESENT TENSE 
“My dogs are on the bed”
started on bed and stayed there never on bed never on bed
Figure 4: Visual stimuli for the TI control “My dogs were in the basket”.
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The model revealed a main effect of Condition, indicating that participants overall 
selected the Target more often in the AM and SI conditions than in the TI condition. 
There was also a main effect of Group, showing that adults selected the Target group 
more often than children in the TI condition. Crucially, there was a significant interac-
tion between Group and Condition when comparing the TI and SI conditions, but no such 
Table 3: Results of binomial logistic regression model on participants’ responses to targets 
(excluding False responses).
Estimate z-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.6 1.6 0.118
[Condition:AM] 1.7 3.7 <.001***
[Condition:SI] 2.8 4.2 <.001***
[Group] –1.5 –2.3 0.021*
[Condition:AM] × [Group] –0.4 –0.7 0.519
[Condition:SI] × [Group] –2.8 –2.6 0.010*
Figure 5: Percentages of group selections per condition.
Figure 6: Percent Target group selection against Literal group selection for individual partici-
pants. Error bars correspond to standard errors.
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interaction when comparing the TI and AM conditions, indicating that children were 
equally adult-like on the AM and TI conditions, but were significantly less adult-like in 
the SI condition.
7 Discussion
The current study employed a novel animated selection paradigm building on Katsos & 
Bishop (2011). We investigated the developmental predictions of the structural and 
semantic approaches to temporal inferences by comparing the performance of a group of 
4–6-year-old children and a group of adults on temporal inferences like that in (28), the 
classical not all implicature of the quantifier “some” in (29), and the inference of negated 
adverbial modifiers, like (30).
(28) My dogs were in the basket.
⇝ My dogs aren’t in the basket
(29) Some of my dogs are in the basket.
⇝ Not all of my dogs are in the basket
(30) My dogs didn’t jump high.
⇝ My dogs jumped
The results of our experiment reveal that overall, children computed all three inference 
types at a lower rate than the adult controls. Importantly, however, while children dif-
fered from adults across inference types, they were more adult-like on temporal inferences 
and the inferences of adverbial modifiers than on scalar implicatures. In particular, we 
found an interaction between group and inference type when comparing temporal infer-
ences and the implicature of “some”, but no such interaction when comparing temporal 
inferences with the inference of adverbial modifiers. The children’s data overall support 
the alternatives-based hypothesis we discussed in Section 3: children were relatively more 
adult-like on adverbial modification, which does not require any lexical replacement of 
alternatives, while they performed relatively worse on the implicature of “some”, which 
requires the lexical replacement of “some” with “all”. Moreover, the finding that children 
were equally adult-like on adverbial modification and temporal inferences lends support 
to a structural approach to temporal inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012). Under 
such an approach, the present tense sentence is structurally contained within its corre-
sponding past tense one, and no lexical replacement of alternatives is required to derive 
the inference.
A further finding of the current study is that both children and adults computed fewer 
temporal inferences overall than either scalar implicatures or adverbial inferences. This 
observed variability across inference types is somewhat reminiscent of recent work indi-
cating that adults compute different scalar implicatures at varying rates (van Tiel et al. 
2016). However, as discussed below, our forced-choice selection task should minimize 
such variation because it rewards the derivation of any relevant inference. While we do 
not have a definitive explanation for the observed difference, we suspect it may come 
from uncertainty as to which time counted as “present” in the context of the task; despite 
our efforts, some participants may have anchored the whole story in the past, and this 
would have made the temporal inference irrelevant. The lower rate of Target responses in 
adults further complicates the interpretation of our results. First, with varying baselines, 
the statistical estimates for interactions become dependent on the choice of link function 
in the binomial model. We verified that our results held with probit, Cauchy CDF, and 
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complementary log-log links, so we are confident that the observed pattern of interaction 
is not an artifact of the logit link function. Second, and more problematic, we cannot rule 
out that the low rates of target choices in adults and children have different sources. For 
instance, one might imagine that adults are more likely than children to anchor the story 
in the past, while the low rate of Target responses in children mostly reflects difficulty 
with the derivation of the temporal inference. As a consequence, our conclusion relies 
on the assumption that whatever caused a low rate of Target responses in adults had the 
same effect on children, such that the interaction with the SI and AM conditions only 
measures children’s specific difficulty with the derivation of the implicature.
Notice that the finding that children computed fewer implicatures from “some” than 
adults diverges from the results reported in Katsos & Bishop (2011), who found children 
to be adult-like on “some” in their selection paradigm. Our finding of non-adult-like 
behavior is more consistent with previous studies that have used the more traditional 
binary truth value judgment task (e.g., Papafragou & Musolino 2003). One potential 
reason for the difference in findings might be a matter of sample size: we tested 38 
children, while Katsos and Bishop tested 15 children in their selection paradigm. A 
more interesting reason for the discrepancy in findings could be that Katsos & Bishop 
(2011) included “all” controls, while we were careful not to include the scalar alter-
natives required for the derivation of the target inferences. While these factors may 
not entirely explain the divergent findings, they could partially explain why children 
appeared to be relatively more adult-like in Katsos & Bishop’s experiment compared to 
ours.
Finally, let us consider the use of the selection paradigm in the context of an existing 
explanation for children’s performance on implicatures. As we have already observed, 
the selection paradigm seems to be well-suited for capturing inferences that are not 
strong enough to trigger pure rejection in a standard binary truth value judgment task. 
In fact, Katsos & Bishop (2011) propose that a binary judgment task might underestimate 
children’s ability to compute implicatures. This is because, as they propose, children 
are more pragmatically tolerant of underinformative statements than adults are, leading 
them to accept an implicature-violating sentence in a binary truth value judgment task, 
even if they are able to derive the implicature. While the selection paradigm does seem 
to be better suited for capturing weaker inferences like the temporal inference, the chil-
dren we tested nevertheless displayed difficulties with implicatures that may not be fully 
explained by the notion of pragmatic tolerance. In principle, the selection task should 
help to circumvent this issue because it strongly encourages the derivation of an infer-
ence, since the literal meaning is not sufficient to narrow down the choice to a single 
answer. By contrast, the truth value judgment task requires participants to make a binary 
choice between accepting an underinformative utterance or rejecting it on the basis of 
pragmatic considerations. Similarly, the covered-box paradigm (see Pearson et al. 2011 
and Huang et al. 2013), which has also been used to test for the derivation of inferences, 
likewise requires  participants to make a binary choice between accepting a sub-optimal 
picture or opting for the unknown covered one (participants must choose the visible pic-
ture if it is compatible with the target sentence, and the covered picture otherwise). In 
our selection paradigm, the choice is much easier: after accessing the literal reading of 
the puppet’s statement, participants can rule out the False group, but cannot at that point 
make a choice between the two remaining groups. Stopping here would require them 
to make a random choice between the Literal and Target groups (or base their choice 
on other, non-linguistic considerations), and this might then push them to derive any 
inference that could help them to decide amongst the pictured groups. In a sense, this 
task translates the pragmatic violation that ensues from the use of an underinformative 
Cremers et al: Testing theories of temporal inferences Art. 139, page 17 of 21
statement into a very concrete communication failure in the absence of the implica-
ture, penalizing participants who do not derive an implicature by requiring them to find 
other cues to make a choice. Nevertheless, we observed differences between children and 
adults on the target inferences, suggesting pragmatic tolerance might not be the entire 
explanation.
8 Conclusion
The current study employed a novel animated selection paradigm to investigate the devel-
opmental predictions of the structural and semantic approaches to temporal infer-
ences. The results of our experiment reveal that overall, children computed all three 
inference types at a lower rate than the adult controls, but they were more adult-like on 
temporal inferences and the inferences of adverbial modifiers than on the scalar implica-
ture of “some”, which requires the lexical replacement of “some” with “all”. We discussed 
the implications of the findings, both for a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis, 
which posits that children’s difficulties with certain implicatures arise from a difficulty in 
accessing the required lexical alternatives, as well as for theories of temporal inferences, 
arguing that the finding that children were more (and equally) adult-like on temporal 
inferences and adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory of temporal inferences 
along the lines of Thomas (2012).
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